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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JASON EWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920379-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of 
aggravated robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
(1992), as the appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is defendant procedurally barred from raising an 
issue of alleged juror bias because he did not ask the court to 
interrogate the juror when the allegation of bias arose? 
Failure to ask the court to interrogate a juror when 
defendant became aware that the juror may have given a voir dire 
answer which defendant thought to be factually incorrect bars a 
later challenge to the composition of the jury. McDonough Power 
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Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 550 n.2, 104 S. Ct. 
845, 847 n.2 (1984). 
2. Did the court correctly assess firearm enhancements 
for the two convictions? Defendant alleges that the court 
misinterpreted the firearm enhancement statute. "The appropriate 
standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of 
statutory law is correction of error." State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 796 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 10, 1991, in two informations, defendant was 
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, both first degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990); one 
count of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); and one count of theft by deception, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(1990) (Record 1243 [hereafter R. 1243] at 6-8 and Record 1244 
[hereafter R. 1244] at 6-7).* 
*The record contains two pleadings files and one transcript. 
One of the pleadings files and the transcript are for District 
Court Case No. 911901244, involving one count of aggravated 
robbery, and are numbered consecutively. Citations to this record 
will be to R. 1244 at . The other pleadings file is for 
District Court Case No. 911901243 and involves one count each of 
aggravated robbery, theft, and theft by deception. This file is 
numbered separately and citations to it will be to R. 1243 at . 
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The single count of aggravated robbery, Case No. 
911901244 (hereafter No. 1244), was tried to a jury on December 
12-13, 1991, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, district judge, presiding 
(R. 1244 at 17-19)• Defendant was found guilty as charged and 
sentencing was set for January 10, 1992 (R. 1244 at 18 and 102). 
On January 10, 1992, sentencing in Case No. 1244 was continued 
and defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery in 
the other case pending against him; the counts of theft and theft 
by deception were dismissed (R. 1243 at 18-19 and R. 1244 at 
104). 
Defendant was sentenced on both cases on February 28, 
1992, receiving consecutive sentences of five years to life (R. 
1243 at 29 and R. 1244 at 105). In addition, the court imposed 
an additional one year firearm enhancement on each case (R. 1243 
at 29 and R. 1244 at 105). Finally, the court imposed an 
additional five year firearm enhancement in Case No. 1244 for a 
second conviction involving use of a firearm (R. 1244 at 105). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Although the facts are not central to the issues raised 
on appeal, a brief statement of the facts underlying the charges 
follows. 
On May 25, 1991, defendant and an accomplice took money 
and checks from the person of Jared Hubbard (R. 1243 at 7-8). He 
pled guilty to this charge (R. 1243 at 18-19). 
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On May 28, 1991, Chris Hase walked out of his business, 
the Midvale Mining Company Restaurant, with the money received 
over the Memorial Day weekend (R. 1244 at 166-69). As he was 
unlocking his car door to take the receipts to the bank, a man 
carrying a shotgun approached him (R. 1244 at 170). Pointing the 
gun at Hase's stomach, the man demanded the two money bags Hase 
was carrying (R. 1244 at 172). Hase handed over the bag with the 
petty cash, but the man demanded "all the money" (R. 1244 at 
173). Hase tossed the bag with the business receipts under his 
car and pushed the shotgun away; he then wrestled the gunman to 
the ground, held him in a wrestling hold, and shouted for help 
(R. 1244 at 174-75). 
When he felt someone trying to pull him away from the 
gunman, he became aware for the first time that the gunman had an 
accomplice (R. 1244 at 176 and 174). The accomplice struck him 
on the head with the shotgun several times but Hase held on to 
the gunman (R. 1244 at 176-78). Just then, some of his employees 
came out of the restaurant to help him; as one of them held the 
gunman, Hase saw a blond male Caucasian with a nylon sock over 
his face getting in to a van with Larry H. Miller display license 
plates (R. 1244 at 178-79). The van sped away when one of Hase's 
employees tried to seize the driver (R. 1244 at 225-26). The 
robbery was reported to the police and a description of the van 
given (R. 1244 at 216 and 247). 
Approximately an hour-and-a-half later, a Salt Lake 
County Deputy Sheriff, Daryl Ondrak, was in the area about eleven 
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blocks away when he spotted a van matching the description of the 
one used in the robbery (R. 1244 at 247-48). The deputy turned 
on his lights and siren and the van sped away at speeds of 55-60 
miles-per-hour through a residential, 25 miles-per-hour zone (R. 
1244 at 251-53). When other police cars tried to block the way, 
the van hit the cars then came to rest against a tree (R. 1244 at 
254 ).2 The driver jumped out of the van while it was still 
moving and ran away on foot (R. 1244 at 282). Another deputy 
gave chase and identified defendant as the driver who ran (R. 
1244 at 282-83). Detective Ondrak and other officers searched 
for defendant; Ondrak found him hiding in the stairwell of a 
duplex, with a lawn chair propped in front of him (R. 1244 at 
257). As defendant came out of the stairwell, he said something 
to the effect that he gave up or surrendered or that there would 
be no problem (R. 1244 at 259). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When defendant became aware that one juror had answered 
a voir dire question differently in one courtroom the day before 
than he did in this case, defendant's obligation was to ask the 
court to further interrogate the juror about the inconsistency. 
Failure to do so bars defendant from challenging the court's 
denial of defendant's motion for mistrial. Even if defendant 
were not procedurally barred from raising the issue, his claim 
2It was later discovered that the van had been stolen from the 
Larry H. Miller dealership (R. 1244 at 271). 
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fails on the merits because he has not shown that the juror would 
have been subject to challenge for cause. 
The trial court did not misconstrue the firearm 
enhancement statute when it assessed the sentencing enhancements. 
A "conviction" includes both the verdict and sentence; 
consequently, defendant was "convicted" of one crime requiring 
enhancement before the court assessed the greater enhancement on 
the second conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ASK THE COURT TO 
INTERROGATE A JUROR WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL 
BECAME AWARE OF A POSSIBILITY OF BIAS IN THAT 
JUROR BARS DEFENDANT FROM CLAIMING THAT THE 
COURT ERRED BY DENYING HIS MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL 
Defendant contends that the trial court conducted an 
inadequate voir dire because the questioning did not reveal that 
one of the jurors, Bogaard, had given a different answer to one 
of the questions when asked it the day before in another court. 
The adequacy of the voir dire conducted at the beginning of the 
trial is not at issue here. Defendant has not pointed out any 
deficiency in the questions asked of the panel before the jury 
was selected. The real issue revolves around what transpired 
when defense counsel, on the second day of trial, asked for a 
mistrial based on counsel's discovery that Bogaard had given a 
different answer to a voir dire question from Judge Rokich the 
day before Bogaard became part of the venire in this case. The 
issue is whether Bogaard gave a false answer in the present case 
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and what obligation defendant had to ask the court to interrogate 
Bogaard about his answer* 
There is no dispute that a trial court must, either by 
its own examination or by permitting counsel to examine the 
prospective jurors, conduct voir dire in such a way that "counsel 
was afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
448 (Utah 1988); Utah R. Crim P. 18(b). A court must also excuse 
for cause any person who, upon examination, demonstrates the 
disqualifications stated in rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 280 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant has not presented any specific ways in which the trial 
court neglected these obligations. Defendant's complaint is 
that, when he discovered that Bogaard had answered a voir dire 
question differently in this case than he had in a previous case, 
the court refused to declare a mistrial. 
A. Procedural bar 
By failing to ask the court to interrogate Bogaard 
about a voir dire answer which defendant thought might be 
factually incorrect, defendant is barred from raising this issue 
on appeal. In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 
U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984), the Supreme Court established a 
two-part test for determining whether a party is entitled to a 
new trial when a juror has arguably failed to honestly answer a 
voir dire question. Ld. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850. Four days 
after entry of judgment, the losing party in McDonough asked 
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permission to approach the jurors because the party believed that 
one of the jurors had answered a voir dire question falsely. The 
Supreme Court reversed an order for new trial and remanded the 
case for application of the following test: 
We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a 
situation, a party must first demonstrate 
that a juror failed to answer honestly a 
material question on voir dire, and then 
further show that a correct response would 
have provided a valid basis for a challenge 
for cause. The motives for concealing 
information may vary, but only those reasons 
that affect a juror's impartiality can truly 
be said to affect the fairness of a trial. 
Id. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850. 
In a footnote, the Court addressed the possibility of 
applying procedural bar: 
It is not clear from the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals whether the information 
stated in Greenwood's affidavit [that a juror 
had allegedly answered a voir dire question 
falsely] was known to respondents or their 
counsel at the time of the voir dire 
examination. If it were, of course, 
respondents would be barred from later 
challenging the composition of the jury when 
they had chosen not to interrogate juror 
Payton further upon receiving an answer which 
they thought to be factually incorrect. See 
Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110, 115-116 (CA8 
1960). 
Id. at 550 n.2, 104 S. Ct. at 847 n.2 (emphasis added). The 
Court treated it as a matter of course that failure to 
interrogate a juror when a questionable answer was given barred a 
later challenge to the panel. 
In State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court raised the same concern that no further interrogation was 
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sought when inconsistent answers came to light. Again in a 
footnote, this Court said: 
When defense counsel first raised the 
problem with the court, consultation with 
Judge Russon and/or exploration of the reason 
for the discrepancy with Juror Wolford might 
have better illuminated the matter. It does 
not appear that either avenue was 
specifically requested by either side. 
Id. at 937 n.6. Although this Court did not go so far as to say 
that failure to seek further "illumination" barred raising the 
matter on appeal, such a concept is not unprecedented. 
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), DeMille 
tried to impeach the verdict against him by use of affidavits 
suggesting that jurors' personal experiences biased them against 
a person accused of hurting a child. Id. at 83. The supreme 
court rejected the claim because the jurors had not been asked 
about their experiences with child abuse or any biases they may 
have had against someone accused of child abuse. "This is true 
despite the fact that DeMille's counsel was given an opportunity 
to question the jurors, an opportunity he declined." Id. 
Relying on the statutory predecessor of rule 12(d), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure,3 and State v. Miller, 674 P. 2d 130 (Utah 
1983), the court held 
3At the time of DeMille, the statute read: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise 
defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at the 
time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may 
grant relief from such waiver. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(d) (repealed). Rule 12(d) is identical. 
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that counsel, who had neither objected to the 
voir dire nor sought permission to inquire 
further into a prospective juror's biases, 
had waived a claim later raised that jurors 
were biased. We therefore hold that 
DeMille's failure to voir dire the jurors on 
this quite foreseeable issue or object to the 
trial court's failure to cover the issue 
constitutes a waiver and bars inquiry into 
the bias question. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d at 83. 
Counsel in DeMille was faulted for not asking questions 
during voir dire on a "foreseeable" issue; however, counsel in 
the present case claims to have only become aware of Bogaard's 
inconsistent answers after the first day of trial. Rule 12(d) 
allows the court to grant relief from waiver for cause. 
Defendant would not have been precluded by rule 12(d) from asking 
the court to conduct further voir dire of Bogaard to explain his 
inconsistent answers. Since defendant did not ask for the 
further voir dire at the appropriate time, instead asking only 
for a mistrial, he has waived any further challenge. 
Defendant had an obligation to try to mitigate any 
problems caused by Bogaard's inconsistent answers by asking for 
further interrogation instead of asking only for a mistrial. 
Support by analogy is found for this in the context of discovery 
violations, where both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
stated that the defendant has an obligation to "mitigate damage 
caused by unexpected" occurrences. State v. Christofferson, 793 
P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990). In Christofferson, the 
prosecution had not disclosed that the defendant had made a 
statement to police officers until the statement was introduced 
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at trial. Christofferson immediately asked for dismissal of the 
charges. Id., at 947. This Court determined that the trial 
court's refusal to dismiss was appropriate: 
[I]t was not unreasonable for the trial court 
to deem it unjust to grant defendant's motion 
[to dismiss] when there were other, less 
harsh remedies . . . available to him. 
[Defendant's failure to mitigate the impact 
of the unexpected testimony by objecting to 
its admission or moving for either a 
continuance or a mistrial precludes his claim 
that it was error to not grant his motion to 
dismiss. 
Id. at 948. The same conclusion had been reached by the supreme 
court in State v. Giffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), when it 
stated: 
Despite being informed of defendant's 
statement prior to trial and having 
reasonable knowledge that such statements 
might be used by the prosecution, defense 
counsel did not move for a continuance, to 
which he would have been entitled. Thus, 
under the facts of this case, we conclude 
that defendant waived relief under rule 16(g) 
. . . by not making timely efforts to 
mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by 
the prosecutor's conduct. 
Id. at 883 (footnote omitted). These cases stand for the 
proposition that a party has an obligation to seek to mitigate 
problems caused by unforeseen circumstances by the least onerous 
method possible. 
In the present case, the least burdensome method would 
have been to ask the court to question Bogaard about the 
allegedly different answers on different days to the same voir 
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dire question. Such questioning would have revealed whether 
Bogaard had answered falsely, or had been rehabilitated by the 
explanations of the law given by both Judges Rokich and Sawaya. 
If the former, the court could have granted the mistrial motion; 
if the latter, the case could proceed. 
Based on the clear statement in McDonouqh and the 
implicit statement in Suarez, defendant's failure to ask the 
court to interrogate Bogaard about his inconsistent answers 
should bar defendant from raising this issue on appeal/ 
B. McDonouqh test 
In Suarez, this Court adopted the two-part McDonouqh 
test "for determining when a juror, challenged for answering 
falsely on voir dire, should be excused," Suarez, 793 P.2d at 
938. 
To obtain a new trial, a defendant "must 
first demonstrate that a juror failed to 
answer honestly a material question of voir 
dire, and then further show that a correct 
response would have provided a valid basis 
for a challenge for cause." 
Id. (quoting McDonouqh, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850). 
Defendant has not met that test. 
^Applying procedural bar in this case would not result in a 
miscarriage of justice because the evidence against defendant is so 
overwhelming. Defendant knew Hase's deposit procedures because 
both defendant and his mother had worked at the restaurant (R. 1244 
at 167). The man. who initially attacked Hase, Donald Runyon, 
testified at trial that defendant was his accomplice and had 
suggested the idea of robbing Hase (R. 1244 at 297a-300). 
Defendant was seen driving the van stolen and used in the robbery 
an hour-and-a-half after robbery. Following a high speed chase, 
defendant fled on foot, but was identified by an officer who chased 
him and was apprehended in a hiding place near where he ditched the 
van (R. 1244 at 248-51, 254-59, 283). 
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Early in the appellate process, defendant asked this 
Court to take judicial notice of the transcript of voir dire in 
the case of State v. Ramirez, Case No. 91190177, which occurred 
in the Third District Court before Judge Rokich on December 10, 
1992. The State's response asked this Court to defer decision on 
judicial notice until briefing, and the Court denied defendant's 
motion. Defendant renewed the motion in his brief and the State 
does not object to notice being taken of the portion of the 
Ramirez transcript dealing with the voir dire question pertinent 
to this case. A copy of the pertinent portion is attached as 
Addendum A to this brief (the full transcript was filed with 
defendant's motion for judicial notice). 
In the Ramirez case, Bogaard, along with fourteen 
others, told Judge Rokich that they might be affected by the 
defendant's failure to testify (Addendum A at 43-46). Bogaard's 
response when asked in Judge Rokich's court about whether the 
defendant's failure to testify would affect him was: 
I'm not sure if it would sway my opinion 
one way or another. I would want— depends 
on the course of the trial, it might sway me. 
I have no opinion one way or another. 
Depending on what comes out, it might have an 
effect. 
(Addendum A at 46). After the jurors expressed their concerns 
about a defendant's failure to testify, Judge Rokich explained 
the law about defendant's right to remain silent; however, before 
he determined whether that explanation had rehabilitated Bogaard, 
a recess was taken and the court struck the whole panel (Addendum 
A at 47-49). As Judge Rokich excused the panel, he strongly 
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reiterated the law regarding a defendant's right to remain silent 
and asked that the venire think seriously about that concept 
(Addendum A at 56-58). The next day, Judge Sawaya also 
instructed the venire that they were to accord the presumption of 
innocence to defendant (R. 1244 at 131, 151-52).5 Judge Sawaya 
also informed the venire that defendant had the right to remain 
silent, which the court explained: 
mean[s] he doesn't have to take the stand and 
testify unless he wishes to. The defendant 
may be satisfied with the evidence presented 
by the state and feel that there's nothing to 
add to it. 
(R. 1244 at 131). When the court asked if anyone felt he or she 
could not afford defendant the presumption of innocence and right 
to remain silent, no one responded (R. 1244 at 131). 
An inability to follow the law as instructed by the 
court may be grounds for dismissal for cause under rule 18(e)(13) 
or (14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 State v. Wilson, 
5Contrary to defendant's assertion in his brief (Brief of 
Appellant at 11-12), there is no indication in the record that 
Judge Sawaya "was apparently aware of the unusual events in the 
[Judge] Rokich voir dire." 
6These provisions read: 
[A] challenge for cause . . . may be taken on 
. . . the following grounds: 
• • • 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of 
the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights 
of the party challenging[.] 
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771 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Utah App. 1989). Dismissal is not 
automatic, however; if further investigation rebuts the inference 
of bias, the juror is not dismissed for cause, .Id. at 1084. 
In Judge Rokich's court, Bogaard had not declared that 
he would not or could not follow the law; instead, he stated that 
he was not sure if a defendant's failure to testify would sway 
him (Addendum A. at 46). After hearing from two judges that no 
significance can be attached to a failure to testify, Bogaard did 
not indicate in this case that he could not follow the law in 
that respect (R. 1244 at 131). 
With that factual background, defendant has not met the 
first prong of the McDonough test, which imposes on defendant an 
affirmative duty to "demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire[.]" 464 U.S. at 556, 
104 S. Ct. at 850. Defendant has failed to show that Bogaard did 
not answer honestly—a deficiency that defendant himself created 
by not requesting additional voir dire of Bogaard.7 
Because defendant has not demonstrated that Bogaard 
answered a material voir dire question falsely, he has not met 
the McDonough test and is not entitled to a new trial. 
7Even if the court had an independent duty to investigate 
further, see State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d at 939 n.ll, defendant 
effectively led the court away from that duty (assuming the duty 
existed) by asking the court to limit its consideration to the 
propriety of granting a mistrial. Defendant has an obligation to 
ask the court to conduct this required, additional investigation 
before asking for a mistrial. 
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C. Remand 
If this Court does not apply procedural bar, the State 
asks that the matter be remanded for further factual 
determinations. In State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), on 
remand, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992), the supreme court declined to 
"speculate and resolve [] factual matters," and remanded the case 
"to the trial court to hold a hearing and to make a factual 
determination as to whether the two-pronged test of McDonough has 
been met by defendant." .Id. at 451. Such a remand may be 
appropriate here. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT 
UNDER THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE 
Defendant claims that the court misconstrued the 
firearm enhancement statute when it assessed a mandatory five 
year enhancement for a second conviction involving a firearm. 
Judge Sawaya sentenced defendant in two separate 
aggravated robbery charges which each involved the use of a 
firearm. Defendant was sentenced to five years to life on the 
case number 911901244, which was tried to a jury on December 12th 
and 13th, 1991 (R. 1244 at 17-19, 352). The court next imposed 
the mandatory one year firearm enhancement penalty pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1990) (R. 1244 at 352). Next, the 
court sentenced defendant in case number 911901243 and imposed 
the penalty of five years to life for the aggravated robbery, and 
the mandatory one year for the use of a firearm (R. 1244 at 352-
53). 
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The judge determined that he was mandated under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) to impose a third mandatory five years 
penalty because defendant was convicted of two crimes involving 
firearms (R. 1244 at 353). The issue is whether the court 
correctly construed the firearm enhancement statute; "[t]he 
appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation 
of statutory law is correction of error." State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted). 
A. Sentenced v. convicted 
The language of § 76-3-203(4) states in relevant part: 
Any person who has been sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment for a felony in which a 
firearm was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony and is convicted 
of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony 
shall, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate 
term to be not less than five nor more than 
ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(emphasis added). Material to understanding this subsection is 
the meaning or construction that the court should give to the 
terms "sentenced" and "convicted." Defendant contends that both 
of his "convictions" preceded in chronological time the 
sentencing under 76-3-203(4) (Br. of Appellant at 23). 
Therefore, defendant argues, there was no second or subsequent 
"conviction" involving a firearm that would invoke subsection 
(4). 
However, the term "conviction" is defined in a manner 
inconsistent with defendant's arguments. As a starting place, 
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Black's Law Dictionary recognizes one of the meanings of 
"conviction" as "[t]he final consummation of the prosecution 
including the judgment or sentence . . • ." (emphasis added). In 
State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991), this Court recognized that while "an ordinary or 
popular usage [of the word 'conviction'] refers to guilt by 
verdict or plea, . . . when applying a legal and technical 
meaning, 'conviction' refers to the final judgment entered on the 
plea or verdict of guilty." Duncan, 812 P.2d at 62. The Duncan 
court held that the* latter, technical meaning of conviction 
applied to rule 609(a) because guilty pleas can "be modified or 
even nullified by subsequent events. Equating a guilty plea with 
a conviction is therefore a questionable practice." Id., at 63. 
This is consistent with the term "judgment of 
conviction" as used in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 22 states in part: 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea 
of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a -judgment of 
conviction which shall include the plea or 
the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court 
shall advise the defendant of his right to 
appeal and the time within which any appeal 
shall be filed. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the term "judgment of conviction" 
includes (1) the verdict or plea, and (2) the sentence. 
Additionally, the use of the technical meaning of the term is a 
mandated form of statutory construction in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-
11 (1986). That section states: 
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Words and phrases are to be construed 
according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language; but technical words 
and phrases, and such others as have acquired 
a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or 
are defined by statute, are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate 
meaning or definition. 
Since the term "judgment of conviction" is defined in the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that definition should carry a 
presumption of being the appropriate meaning in the context of 
criminal procedure law. 
Applying the technical meaning of "conviction," 
defendant was not convicted of either crime until he received his 
sentence. The sentence for case number 1244 preceded the 
sentence (and therefore conviction) for case number 1243. Thus, 
defendant was sentenced and had a judgment of conviction passed 
in case number 1243 that followed an earlier sentence in 1244. 
The five year enhancement under § 76-3-203(4) followed the 
sentencing (thus, the conviction) in both cases. Following this 
reasoning, the defendant's firearm penalty enhancement under § 
76-3-203(4) is proper. 
The record demonstrates that the court pronounced the 
basic sentence (including the one-year firearm enhancement) in 
Case No. 1244 first, pronounced the basic sentence (including the 
one-year firearm enhancement) in Case No. 1243, then imposed the 
additional five-year firearm enhancement in Case No. 1244 (R. 
1244 at 352-53). The language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) 
does not require that the enhancement for a second conviction be 
imposed on the second conviction. As a practical matter, most 
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second convictions would occur later in time and the five-year 
enhancement would be imposed on the second conviction. However, 
in the present case, defendant managed to have his sentencing for 
two separate crimes occur on the same day. Whether the second 
enhancement was imposed on one case or the other should not be 
grounds for reversing the case. "Any error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). The court 
could have imposed the second enhancement on Case No. 1243; 
consequently, any error in imposing the additional enhancement on 
the first case sentenced does not affect defendant's rights and 
should be disregarded. 
The court did err in assessing "an additional five year 
enhancement" (R. 1244 at 353 and 105). The statute provides that 
the enhancement for a subsequent conviction shall be "for an 
indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more than ten 
years[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4). The additional 
enhancement should be corrected to the indeterminate term. 
B. The federal firearm enhancement statute 
Defendant also argues that the Utah firearm enhancement 
statute should be interpreted as the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals interpreted the federal firearm statute in United States 
v. Abreu and Thornburah, 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992) (en 
banc). The federal firearm enhancement states in part: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime 
of violence or drug trafficking crime . . ., 
uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition 
to the punishment provided for such crime of 
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violence or drug trafficking crime, be 
sentenced to imprisonment for five years, . . 
In the case of his second or subsequent 
conviction under this subsection, such person 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty 
years[.] 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). The issue in 
Abreu was whether a defendant could be sentenced under the 
"second or subsequent" provision for a second offense conviction 
in a single indictment.8 The Abreu court held that the 
defendant could not be so charged. The court stated that the 
legislative history was sparse, and so the court needed to reach 
its decision on the logic behind the statute. The penological 
logic, according to the court, was to impose a stiffer sentence 
on defendants that were not rehabilitated by the first sentence 
they received under the firearm enhancement statute. JLd. at 
1453. However, as the dissent noted, this reading added more 
into the statute than was there. The dissent noted that the 
Tenth Circuit's interpretation conflicts with the interpretation 
of six other circuits, which other interpretation the dissent 
found persuasive. JId. at 1454-55. In United States v. Rawlinqs, 
821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert, denied^ 484 U.S. 979, 108 S.Ct. 
494, 98 L.Ed.2d 492 (1987), the Eleventli Circuit applied rules of 
statutory construction and concluded that the plain language of 
the statute mandated an enhancement for a second conviction which 
arose out of the same indictment as the first. Using the common 
8The fact that defendant's two convictions arose out of 
separate cases and separate charging documents serves to 
distinguish the present case from Abreu. 
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definition of "second," the court concluded that, "[i]n the 
context of the statute, it only means one more after the first, 
or another or additional conviction," Ijd. at 1545. 
Consequently, a "second or subsequent conviction" triggers the 
enhancement provision, even though the second conviction is in 
the same indictment as the first, .Id.. Accord, United States v. 
Ravnor, 939 F.2d 191, 193-94 (4th Cir.1991) (agreeing with 
Rawlings and holding that section 924(c) enhancement applies to 
defendant charged with two counts in same indictment); United 
States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (6th Cir.) (relying on 
"reasoning in Rawlings" to conclude that two separate 924(c) 
offenses charged in same indictment support enhanced sentences), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 192, 112 L.Ed.2d 154 
(1990); United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659, 668 (8th Cir.) 
(agreeing with holding and reasoning of Rawlings), cert, denied. 
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 112, 112 L.Ed.2d 81 (1990); United 
States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 534, 112 L.Ed.2d 544 (1990); 
United States v. Bernier, 954 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.1992) (per curiam) 
(noting holding in Rawlings line of cases and reaching same 
result). 
C. Comparison with the habitual criminal statute 
Defendant alludes to the habitual criminal statute as 
support for his construction of the firearm enhancement statute 
(Br. of Appellant at 24). In part, that statute reads, "Any 
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
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felony offenses . . . may, upon conviction of . . • a felony 
. . . be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned . . 
. for from five years to life." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). Rather than assisting defendant, 
this statute points out the fallacy of the construction he seeks. 
The habitual criminal statutes demonstrates that, had the 
legislature intended the firearm enhancement statute to apply 
only to a second conviction occurring after a person had served a 
sentence for the first, the legislature could have so stated. 
The Utah habitual criminal statute requires conviction, sentence 
and commitment before a court may penalize a defendant under its 
terms. The firearm enhancement statute has no such requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this }ZP" day of January, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ILENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. CRIMINAL NO. 9 1 1 9 0 1 7 7 
NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ, 
DEFENDANT. 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE 
JURY VOIR DIRE 
i 
DECEMBER 1 0 , 1 9 9 2 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
DAVID E . YOCOM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
BY THOMAS P . VUYK 
DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY 
ELIZABETH A . BOWMAN 
VERNICE S . AH CHING 
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8 4 1 1 1 
THE COURT: — INVOLVED IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL? 
MS. OLSON: NO. 
THE COURT: MRS. BUCKLEY. 
MS. BUCKLEY: MY HUSBAND IS A JUDGE OF 
RIVERTON. 
THE COURT: WOULD THAT AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO 
BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS CASE? 
MS. BUCKLEY: NO. 
THE COURT: I HAVE MRS. WADE. 
MS. WADE: I HAVE A NIECE THAT WAS A UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROLMAN. 
THE COURT: WOULD THAT AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO 
BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HERE TODAY? 
MS. WADE: NO. 
THE COURT: OR FOR THE NEXT FOUR DAYS, 
WHATEVER THE CASE MAY BE? SO, IF YOU WERE FAIR FOR ONE 
DAY, YOU HAVE TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL THE WHOLE TRIAL. 
NOW, THERE'S A JURY INSTRUCTION TO THE 
EFFECT— THAT WILL BE GIVEN TO THOSE FINALLY CHOSEN— 
THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE TO TESTIFY IF HE 
DOESN'T DESIRE TO DO SO. WOULD YOU HOLD THAT AGAINST 
HIM, IF HE DIDN'T TESTIFY? 
IF YOU WOULD, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND. 
MRS. BUCKLEY, YOU WOULD HOLD THAT AGAINST THE 
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DEFENDANT? 
MS. BUCKLEY: I WOULD. 
THE COURT: NOW--
MS. BOWMAN: MAY I ASK YOU TO ASK IF ANY OF 
THE OTHERS MIGHT HOLD IT AGAINST HIM? 
THE COURT: I AM GOING TO GET TO THAT. 
MR. CAMPBELL? 
MR. CAMPBELL: IT MIGHT AFFECT MY OPINION. 
THE COURT: IF HE DIDN'T TESTIFY? 
MR. CAMPBELL: IF HE DIDN'T, RIGHT. 
THE COURT: I HAVE MRS. LOVE. 
MS. LOVE: I THINK I WOULD WANT THE REASON 
CLARIFIED BEFORE I MADE A DETERMINATION WHETHER I WOULD 
HOLD IT AGAINST HIM. 
BELIEVE. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MS. 
MR. 
MS. 
HONOR? 
THE 
COURT: 
LEFLER: 
COURT: 
OLSON: 
TRUMP: 
BOWMAN: 
COURT: 
I WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A REASON, I 
OKAY. AND MR. LEFLER. 
SAME. 
AND MRS. OLSON. 
SAME. 
SAME. 
COULD WE GET THEIR NAMES, YOUR 
LET'S START OUT— OKAY. LET'S 
START OUT HERE. START OUT FROM NUMBER--
MS. FAILNER: : I'M KATHLEEN FAILNER. 
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MS. BOWMAN: *AND YOU WOULD WANT THE REASON 
THAT SOMEBODY DIDN'T TESTIFY? 
MS. FAILNER: YES. 
MS. BOWMAN: COULD WE ASK HER IF SHE HAS ANY 
OTHER CONCERNS ABOUT THAT? 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER CONCERNS? 
MS. FAILNER: I GUESS I WOULD HAVE— I JUST 
WOULD HAVE A QUESTION WHY THE INDIVIDUAL WOULD NOT WANT 
TO STATE THEIR CASE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. MR. BOSWELL, AND YOU WANT 
TO KNOW THE REASON WHY HE DIDN'T TESTIFY? 
MR. BOSWELL: YEAH. 
THE COURT: OKAY. MR. TRUMP? 
MR. TRUMP: SAME REASON. 
THE COURT: LET'S SEE. WE'VE GOT 
MRS. OLSON— NO. MR. TURPIN. 
MR. TURPIN: SAME. YEAH, I WOULD WANT TO 
KNOW WHY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND MRS. OLSON. 
MS. OLSON: YES. 
THE COURT: MR. LEFLER. 
MR. LEFLER: SAME. 
THE COURT: MR. CAMPBELL. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I NEED A REASON. 
THE COURT: OKAY. FINE. WE GOT MRS. RINK. 
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MS. RINK: I'M THE SAME WAY. I WOULD WANT A 
REASON WHY HE WOULDN'T WANT TO DEFEND HIMSELF. 
MS. GLAUSER: SAME HERE. 
THE COURT: LET'S SEE. THAT'S MRS.— 
MS. GLAUSER: GLAUSER. 
THE COURT: MRS. GLAUSER. 
ANYBODY ELSE? MR. BOGAARD? 
MR. BOGAARD: I'M NOT SURE IF IT WOULD SWAY 
MY OPINION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I WOULD WANT-- DEPENDS 
ON THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, IT MIGHT SWAY ME. I HAVE 
NO OPINION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. DEPENDING ON WHAT COMES 
OUT, IT MIGHT HAVE AN EFFECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND MRS. BURNETT. 
MS. BURNETT: I, TOO, WOULD LIKE SOME 
JUSTIFICATION AS TO WHY HE WOULD NOT. 
THE COURT: AND MRS. HULET, SAME REASON? 
MS. HULET: I WOULD— YES, IF HE DIDN'T GIVE 
A REASON I MIGHT FIGURE WHAT ELSE? WHICH MIGHT NOT BE 
RIGHT. 
THE COURT: THE LAW IS THAT A DEFENDANT DOES 
NOT HAVE TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF. THAT'S THE LAW. 
AND HE HAS THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND IT CANNOT BE 
HELD AGAINST HIM. HE DOESN'T HAVE TO GIVE ANY REASON. 
AND THAT'S AN INSTRUCTION YOU WOULD HAVE TO-- THAT 
WOULD BE GIVEN THAT YOU'RE NOT TO HOLD IT AGAINST THE 
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DEFENDANT, THE FACT IF HE FAILS TESTIFY, BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE TO TESTIFY IF HE FEELS THAT THE 
EVIDENCE AS SUBMITTED IS NOT SUFFICE FOR HIS 
CONVICTION. 
SO, NOW WITH THAT EXPLANATION, CAN YOU SIT 
HERE AND BE IMPARTIAL? THE FACT THAT A NUMBER OF YOU 
MADE THAT STATEMENT, WOULD THAT AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO 
BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL? IF IT DOES, THEN, THAT'S A 
SERIOUS PROBLEM. 
SO WITH THAT EXPLANATION, CAN YOU STILL BE 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL EVEN THOUGH HE DOESN'T TAKE THE 
STAND AND GIVE A REASON WHY HE DOESN'T TESTIFY? AGAIN, 
THE TEST IS, YOU ARE ONLY TO DECIDE THE CASE BASED UPON 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED FROM THE MOUTHS OF THE WITNESSES 
UNDER OATH AND THE DOCUMENTS ADMITTED. SO IF YOU CAN'T 
DO THAT, THEN YOU CAN'T BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL. 
MS. BOWMAN: YOUR HONOR, WE ASK YOU TO ASK IF 
ANY OF THEM WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN FOLLOWING THE LAW 
AS YOU STATED GIVEN THE CONCERNS THAT THEY WANT 
REASONS. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, LET'S TAKE A SHORT 
RECESS AND THE JURY— 
JOHN, DON'T LET THEM ESCAPE. AND COUNSEL-- I 
CAN'T VERY WELL TALK TO THEM HERE IN A WHISPER. WE'LL 
GO INTO CHAMBER. JOHN, YOU KEEP EVERYBODY HERE AND 
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MAKE SURE NO ONE ESCAPES WHILE WE HAVE A SHORT IN-COURT 
CONFERENCE. 
(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
HELD IN THE COURT'S CHAMBERS OUT OF THE 
PRESENCE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL.) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY INDICATE THAT 
COURT HAS CONVENED IN ITS CHAMBERS, THE DEFENDANT IS 
PRESENT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, THE STATE IS 
REPRESENTED BY MR. VUYK. 
I THINK WE HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THIS 
CASE. 
MR. VUYK: I THINK WE HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. 
THE COURT: I THINK THE ONLY THING I CAN DO 
IS DISMISS THIS JURY AND CALL ANOTHER JURY. 
WE'RE 
MS. 
THE 
BOWMAN 
COURT: 
GOING TO HAVE ' 
REGARDS T O — 
STATE THE 
INDICATED 
MR. 
LAW 
THE 
MR. 
VUYK: 
BEFORE 
COURT: 
VUYK : 
THAT HE IS 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
BOWMAN 
: I THINK SO 
AND THAT'S 
rO OVERCOME. 
I THINK WHAT 
YOU ASK THE 
YES. 
, TOO. 
GOING TO 
I DON'T-
YOU HAVE 
QUESTION. 
I THINK IF YOU'D DONE 
NOT REQUIRED 
I THINK— 
: HE DID. 
— 
BE A HURDLE 
- WITH 
TO DO 
THAT, 
IS 
IF YOU 
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NEED THAT 
THE 
MR. 
MS. 
COURT: 
VUYK : 
BOWMAN 
I DID. 
THEY WANT IT DEEPER THAN THAT. 
: BUT THAT GOT THE TRUTH OUT. WE 
THESE ARE CONCERNS THAT THEY HAVE AND IT'S 
JUST AS WELL 1 
IT BUT TO 
AFTERNOON 
MR. 
WE KNOW 
VUYK: 
STRIKE THE 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
r IF 
TRY TO GET A , 
ALTERNATE 
ALTERNATE. 
MR. 
COURT: 
VUYK: 
COURT: 
THAT. 
I DON'T KNOW HOW ELSE YOU CAN DO 
PANEL. 
I'M GOING TO STRIKE THE PANEL. 
WE'LL TRY AGAIN FOR THE MORNING. 
WELL, WE CAN TRY FOR THIS 
I CAN GET A HOLD OF OTHER JURORS. WE'LL 
JURY THIS AFTERNOON. 
VUYK: 
ALSO? 
THE 
» 
MR. 
COURT: 
VUYK: 
NOW, ARE WE TALKING ABOUT ONE 
ONE OR TWO. AT LEAST ONE 
THAT WOULD GIVE US, IF WE GOT 20, 
THEN WE'LL HAVE TO HAVE A COUPLE MORE PEREMPTORIES. SO 
I DON'T THINK 
IT. 
TODAY. 
WITH 23. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
YOU'RE 
COURT: 
VUYK: 
COURT: 
GOING T O — 23 WILL GET YOU THROUGH 
NO. WE COULDN'T MAKE IT HERE 
I DON'T THINK YOU COULD MAKE IT 
I KNOW WE COULDN'T. 
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MR. VUYK: DON'T KNOW HOW MANY. 35? 40? 
THE COURT: WE DON'T HAVE ENOUGH JURORS HERE 
TODAY. 
MR. VUYK: THAT'S WHY I WONDER IF YOU COULD 
ACTUALLY DO THAT BY THIS AFTERNOON TO GET SUFFICIENT--
THE COURT: WELL, WE'LL SEE. I'LL TALK TO 
THE--
MR. VUYK: I THINK IF WE START A JURY WE 
OUGHT TO HAVE AT LEAST 35, 40 PEOPLE. 
THE COURT: WE CAN 
NUMBER OF THEM WE WOULD HAVE 
HERE 
WHOLE 
MR. VUYK: 
THE COURT: 
TO FILL IN, BUT 
YES. 
OKAY. 
'T MAKE IT 
TO EXCUSE 
TODAY. I SAW A 
FOR CAUSE TODAY. 
I COULD GET MORE JURORS 
THEN I HAVE TO 
! IMPANELING PROCESS. 
I EXPLAINED TO THEM ABOUT 
AS INSTRUCTED BY ME, 
IT'S 
TAKE 
SAID 
MR. VUYK: 
A QUESTION THAT 
AND YET-
I THINK 
LOTS OF 
THE STAND. I THINK ONE 
--
GO THROUGH THE 
FOLLOWING THE LAW 
THEY WERE 
PEOPLE 
BEING HONEST. 
WANT-- WHY HE WON'T 
LADY SAID 
I WANT TO KNOW WHY HE WOULDN'T 
HIMSELF. 
THE COURT: 
I'M GOING TO HAVE TO 
AHEAE > AND DISMISS THE 
THAT'S GOING 
IT CLEARLY. SHE 
WANT TO DEFEND 
TO BE A HURDLE. SO 
HAVE MORE JURORS HERE. I CAN GO 
: JURORS AND WE' 'LL CALL ANOTHER 
K n 
PANEL. 
MR. VUYK: ARE WE GOING TO TRY FOR 1:30 OR 
2:00? 
THE COURT: WHICH IS THE EASIER? PROBABLY 
2 O'CLOCK, BUT LET'S JUST SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. 
MR. VUYK: WELL, I'LL BE IN THE OFFICE. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T I GO DOWN RIGHT NOW 
AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO BEFORE WE RECONVENE. 
MR. VUYK: OKAY. LEAVE THEM SITTING THERE, 
AND WAIT FOR— 
THE COURT: THEY MAY NEED THE JURORS OVER IN 
JUDGE MURPHY'S COURT. SO I'LL GO DOWNSTAIRS AND SEE, 
BUT I DON'T SEE HOW WE'D GET A PANEL OUT OF THAT GROUP 
TODAY. 
MR. VUYK: 
ONLY HAD 23, IN FACT 
THE COURT: 
MS. BOWMAN 
THE COURT: 
THE COURT: 
I DON'T EITHER. IN FACT, WHEN WE 
, BETSY AND I TALKED ABOUT THAT. 
THERE'S NO WAY. 
: OKAY. 
I'LL BE RIGHT BACK. 
(PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS.) 
I HAVE THE JURY CLERK HERE. 
WHAT WE COULD DO IS GO THROUGH THE LIST OF 
THOSE THAT YOU WOULD THINK WE CAN DISMISS FOR CAUSE, 
TAKE THE REMAINING JURORS FROM JUDGE MURPHY'S COURT, 
AND WE HAVE ONE MORE JURY TO SELECT FROM. JUDGE 
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DANIELS' WAS EXCUSED. HE TOOK 25 MINUTES FOR HIS 
ONE-DAY CIVIL MATTER. 
MR. VUYK: WE WOULD NEED 35 JURORS, A MINIMUM 
NUMBER. 
THE JURY CLERK: THE PROBLEM I'M HAVING IS 
THAT I HAVE RUN COMPLETELY OUT OF JURORS. I HAVE HAD 
SEVERAL SURPRISES FROM JUDGE STIRBA AND JUDGE MURPHY. 
I ALSO HAD SOME SICK JURORS, SO I ONLY HAD A HUNDRED 
FIFTY AVAILABLE FOR JUST THIS PARTICULAR WEEK, AND 
WHERE I'M AT NOW IS I HAVE GOTTEN SO DESPERATE THAT I 
HAD TO GO TO CIRCUIT COURT AND TAKE 40 JURORS. 
I DO HAVE 40 OTHERS THAT I COULD CALL BY 
HAND, BUT I DON'T KNOW I F — I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I 
WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH THEM FOR TODAY. I DON'T KNOW IF 
I COULD GET THAT MANY HERE TODAY. I CAN TRY MY BEST. 
MR. VUYK: I THINK WE OUGHT TO MAKE SURE. 
RATHER THAN THAT, WHY DON'T WE SET IT FOR TOMORROW. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL SET IT FOR TOMORROW 
MORNING AT 9:00. 
THE COURT: IF YOU CAN GET THE 35 TO 40. 
WITH JUST THE 22 WE COULDN'T HAVE MADE IT TODAY 
REGARDLESS. 
MR. VUYK: IF WE'RE GOING TO HAVE ONE 
ALTERNATE, WE'RE EACH GOING GET AT LEAST FIVE 
PEREMPTORIES, SO THAT'S TEN. WE HAVE TO HAVE 19 PEOPLE 
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AVAILABLE AND WE-- YOU GOT 13 FOR CAUSE, AND OTHER THAN 
THAT, WE FIGURE--
THE COURT: YES. 
THE JURY CLERK: THE PEOPLE THAT YOU HAVE NOT 
LOOKED AT YET. OR IS THERE ANY CHANCE THAT I CAN BRING 
THESE PEOPLE BACK? 
MR. VUYK: I DON'T THINK SO. 
THE COURT: I WOULDN'T TRY, THOUGH. 
MS. BOWMAN: THEY HAVE BEEN TAINTED. 
THE COURT: WE COULDN'T USE ANY OF THOSE 
JURORS. 
MS. BOWMAN: ARE THE QUESTIONS THAT ARE SENT 
TO THE JURORS, POTENTIAL JURORS, FOR CIRCUIT COURT THE 
SAME AS THE QUESTIONS THAT GET SENT OUT TO THE 
POTENTIAL DISTRICT COURT JURORS? 
THE JURY CLERK: YES. THEY ARE BASICALLY 
QUESTIONING: ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES? 
CAN YOU READ AND WRITE THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE? HAVE 
YOU— YOU KNOW, ARE YOU A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY? 
NOW, YOU COULD SELECT THE NAMES OF THE 
CIRCUIT COURT ALSO SINCE THEY ARE DIRECTLY FROM MY 
LIST, MY SOURCE LIST. THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXCUSED 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT. THEY HAVE NO IDEA THAT I'M 
GOING TO BE CALLING THEM. 
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MS. BOWMAN: THEY HAVE BEEN EXCUSED BECAUSE 
NO JURY--
THE JURY CLERK: RIGHT. 
MS. BOWMAN: -- WAS PICKED, NOT BECAUSE THEY 
HAD ANY--
THE JURY CLERK: DID NOT HAVE ANY JURIES FOR 
THEM. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T WE CALL THEM? 
THE JURY CLERK: I CAN CALL ALL 40 OF THOSE 
PEOPLE IN. I'M NOT SAYING I COULD REACH THEM, BUT I 
CAN CALL AS MANY AS I POSSIBLY CAN. 
MR. VUYK: HOW ABOUT THE ONES LEFT OVER FROM 
THE OTHER COURTS THAT WERE EXCUSED FROM ANY COURT? 
CAN'T YOU CALL THEM AGAIN? 
THE JURY CLERK: I COULD, BUT I WAS GOING TO 
USE THE ONES THAT WERE NOT USED IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE 
FOR JUDGE LEWIS' CASE FOR TOMORROW, WHICH IS NOT GOING 
TO BE A GOOD IDEA SINCE IT'S THE SAME THING WITH THE 
JUDGE LEWIS CASE. 
THE COURT: YOU CAN'T USE THESE IN JUDGE 
LEWIS' CASE. 
THE JURY CLERK: THAT'S GOING TO CAUSE ME A 
PROBLEM. THERE ARE 24 PEOPLE I CAN'T USE AT ALL. 
THERE'S A CHANCE I COULD USE THEM FOR JUDGE DANIELS' 
CASE THAT HE HAS SET FOR THURSDAY. 
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I MEAN, YOU'RE TALKING FOR EXAMPLE— ITOPLE 
BEING PUT INTO A POSITION THAT ALL OF A SUDDEN THEY— 
THEY'RE COMING UP REQUESTING THESE PARTICULAR CASES, 
GIVING ME A DAY'S NOTICE WHEN THEY USUALLY HAVE TO GIVE 
ME TWO WEEKS' NOTICE TO SUMMONS THESE PEOPLE, AND I 
JUST— I WAS TAKEN OFF GUARD. 
MR. VUYK: IF WE CAN GET 35 OR 4 0 JURORS. 
THE JURY CLERK: DO "YOU WANT THEM OFF THIS 
LIST HERE? THEY WILL BE PERSONALLY TALKING TO ME ONLY, 
AND I'LL INDICATE IT'S A CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
THAT THEY HAVE BEEN CALLED UPON. 
THE COURT: NOW, I WANT A STIPULATION ON THE 
RECORD THEN THAT THE STATE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL AGREE 
THAT THE JURY CLERK CAN CALL A MINIMUM OF 35 PEOPLE 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT LIST? 
MR. VUYK: 
THE COURT: 
APPEAL. 
MS. BOWMAN: 
THE COURT: 
BEFORE--
MS. BOWMAN: 
BE CALLED. 
THE COURT: 
AND DO THAT AND HAVE 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
AND IT'S NOT A GROUNDS FOR 
: AS FAR AS I KNOW, IT'S NOT. 
WELL, I'VE GOT TO GET THAT 
! I'M NOT DISPUTING THAT THAT LIST 
OKAY. FINE. SO WE'LL GO AHEAD 
THEM START TOMORROW AT 9:30. 
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I'LL DISMISS THIS JURY. 
MR. VUYK: OKAY. 
(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
HELD IN OPEN COURT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL. PRESENT WAS THE 
DEFENDANT WITH HIS COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR 
THE STATE.) 
THE COURT: IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT I HAD 
SO MANY NEGATIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION CONCERNING 
THE FACT OF MR. RAMIREZ'S RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY, IT 
BECOME APPARENT TO THIS COURT THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL, NOR 
THE STATE, COULD RECEIVE A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
AS A RESULT I HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DISMISS 
THIS JURY AND I'LL HAVE TO CALL ANOTHER JURY TOMORROW 
AND TRY THIS CASE. BECAUSE, AS I STATED HERE AND I 
SAID MANY TIMES, I DON'T WANT ANYONE EVER LEAVING MY 
COURT SAYING THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL TRIAL. AND THAT WOULD NOT BE THE CASE HERE. 
AND I WANT ALL OF YOU TO KNOW THAT. I WANT 
YOU ALL TO KNOW THAT LAWS OF UTAH PROVIDE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND YOU CANNOT 
INFER GUILT OR INNOCENCE BY THE MERE FACT THAT HE 
DOESN'T TAKE THE STAND. AND THOSE THAT WANT HIM TO 
HAVE A REASON, WELL, YOU CAN'T BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL, 
BECAUSE YOU, IN EFFECT, HAVE SAID THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL 
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IS MAYBE GUILTY, AND IT SHOULD BE THE OTHER WAY AROUND; 
HE IS INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY. 
SO WITH THAT, I'M SORRY THAT WE HAVE TO 
ADJOURN AT THIS TIME, BUT I TRUST THAT YOU WILL THINK 
THIS OVER, AND THIS IS A REAL CONCERN TO ME, OF GRAVE 
CONCERN TO ME, THAT PEOPLE IN OUR SOCIETY COME HERE 
WITH THE IDEA THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IS GUILTY BEFORE HE IS 
FOUND GUILTY. SO THINK ABOUT THAT. SOMEDAY, YOU NEVER 
KNOW, YOU MAY BE IN THIS COURT AND I TRUST THAT YOU 
WOULD WANT PEOPLE HERE THAT WOULD SAY I'M INNOCENT 
UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY AND THAT THE FACT THAT I DON'T 
TESTIFY SHOULD NOT BE HELD AGAINST ME. 
MS. BOWMAN: JUDGE, I WOULD WANT TO THANK 
EVERYBODY, THOUGH, FOR BEING HONEST WITH US. 
THE COURT: I'M GOING TO THANK THEM FOR BEING 
HERE, BECAUSE, AS I SAY, IT'S OF GRAVE CONCERN TO ME 
THAT IN TODAY'S SOCIETY THAT WE HAVE THAT-- TO BE AN 
ATTORNEY IN COURT— AND I HAVE TO SAY THAT I HAVE BEEN 
ON THE BENCH SEVEN YEARS AND I THINK THIS IS THE FIRST 
TIME THAT THIS HAS EVER OCCURRED IN ALL THE JURY TRIALS 
I HAVE HELD 
I 
IT'S A BUSY 
THAT YOU'RE 
OPPORTUNITY 
IN TOOELE, COALVILLE AND IN SALT LAKE. 
WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE. I KNOW 
TIME OF THE YEAR AND I APPRECIATE THE FACT 
HERE. AND I TRUST THAT YOU WILL HAVE AN 
TO BE HERE AGAIN, AND I TRUST THAT YOU WILL 
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GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT I HAVE TO SAY ABOUT GUILT AND 
INNOCENCE. 
SO, WITH THAT, YOU'RE DISMISSED. 
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONTINUED TO 
DECEMBER 11, 1991, AS 9:30 A.M.) 
